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Abstract: Event studies represent an increasingly popular method to evaluate (fu-
ture) welfare effects of economic policy decisions. The basic idea is to hire the stock 
market as a referee, i.e. that stock market reactions to the announcement of policy 
decision are interpreted to contain superior information about the (future) welfare 
effects of these decisions. This paper investigates the degree of reliability of event 
studies as a policy programs evaluation method by critically reflecting upon two 
underlying assumptions. Since both the information superiority and efficiency of 
financial markets and, in particular, the conclusion from abnormal returns to (fu-
ture) economic welfare effects consist of considerable interpretation problems, we 
issue a note of caution: scientists and policymakers should be very reluctant to rely 
on stock market reactions as a referee on economic policy decisions. Event studies 
cannot replace thorough theory-driven economic analysis. 
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1. Introduction  
Recently, there is a growing literature that attempts to evaluate economic policy 
decisions or regulatory reforms by analyzing the stock market reactions to the an-
nouncement of these decisions. So-called ‘event studies’ isolate with sophisticated 
econometric techniques so-called abnormal returns, i.e. movements in stock prices 
that correlate only to the ‘event’ (announcement) and not to other influences. This 
is a well-established method for the empirical analysis of drivers of stock market 
prices. However, event studies are increasingly used to evaluate the welfare effects 
of regulatory reforms. The event-specific reaction of the stock prices is believed to 
reveal superior information about the welfare effects of announced economic poli-
cy decisions (which represent the events). Thus, they are believed to be able to 
serve as a referee for the economic ‘quality’ of the announced reforms. The under-
lying conceptual idea is “hiring the stock market as an advisor” (Moser & Rose 
2011a). Along these lines, inter alia, regional trade agreements (Moser & Rose 
2011b), merger control decisions (Duso et al. 2011), sector regulation (Dnes et al. 
1998) or economic recovery and anti-crisis programs (Miyakoshi et al. 2007) are 
exposed and subjected to the judgment of the stock markets with the intention of 
deriving economic policy recommendations. While this is usually done by scientists, 
also a couple of competition authorities have already employed event studies 
themselves in order to evaluate some of their merger control decisions (namely 
Greece, Japan, and Switzerland1).  
This paper reflects upon the question: shall we ‘hire’ the stock market to tell us 
about right or wrong economic policy decisions (in terms of welfare effects)? We 
call for a note of caution: skepticism about the competence of stock markets to 
reveal superior knowledge about economic policy programs is justified when look-
ing at the empirical validity of the assumptions on which the event study approach 
to evaluating policy programs rests. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
briefly describes the event study methodology. Section 3 analyzes event studies as 
an evaluation approach by introducing three selected examples from the more re-
                                                            
1 According to these countries’ written reports to the 2011 OECD roundtable on ‘Impact Evaluati-
on of Merger Decisions’ (reports on file with the authors). 
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cent literature. Following that, section 4 critically reviews the general approach of 
using stock market reactions as policy evaluators (section 4.1) as well as demon-
strates the principal ambiguities of interpreting the stock market signals in terms of 
welfare effects of policy decisions (section 4.2). The three examples from section 3 
are exemplarily employed here. Section 5 concludes with a note of caution.  
 
2. Fundamentals of Event Studies 
Event Studies are a statistical methodology which was initially employed in eco-
nomics in areas like accounting and financial markets’ analysis. In a nutshell, event 
studies quantitatively estimate the influence of specified ‘events’ (often announce-
ments distributed via media regarding, for instance, business and company news, 
merger announcements, economic policy decisions, regulatory changes, strategic 
business decisions, enactment of major legislation, etc.) on the price of securities, 
stocks and bonds listed and traded on stock exchanges (Corrado 2011; McWilliams 
& Siegel 1997). The generic model in the econometric analysis of most event stud-
ies is the following market model: 
ܴ௧,௝ = ௝ܽ + ௝ܾ * ܴܯ௧,௝ + ݁௧,௝ . 
ܴ௧,௝ denotes the return of security j on day t with ܴܯ௧,௝ denoting the overall market 
return and the term ݁௧,௝ defines firm related return. ௝ܽ and ௝ܾ  are the linear coeffi-
cients for the regression equation above. The target in event studies is to estimate 
the abnormal returns (At), i.e. the unexpected return obtained on the day of the 
announcement given the expected overall market return.  
ܣ௧ ൌ  ܴ௧ െ ܧሺܴ௧|ܴܯ௧ሻ ൌ  ܴ௧ െ ܽ െ ܾ כ ܴܯ௧ 
The significance of abnormal returns is tested by definition of statistical tests. The 
tests results will be captured by defining critical values as thresholds. A large variety 
of tests have been proposed for exploring and validating the existence of abnormal 
return in response to an event. The inherent technical challenge of event studies 
lies in the proper distinction of event-specific effects from other, more general in-
fluences on the observed stock price movement (Corrado 2011).  
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However, this paper does not aim to discuss the sophisticated econometrics of 
event studies.2 Instead, the interpretation of event study results and the derivation 
of economic policy conclusions stand in the focus of our analysis. In this specific 
context, two different types of the application of the event study method must be 
distinguished. 
(i) Studies that try to find out how announcements (“events”) in the media or 
from companies, policymakers, authorities, governments or agencies influ-
ence stock market prices (event studies to identify drivers of stock market 
prices). Here the aim is to explore whether or not significant abnormal re-
turns result as a consequence of the announcements of decisions. Thus, the 
research targets to explain the determinants of stock price dynamics and to 
identify which factors influence stock prices and how they do so. This is the 
original way how event studies used to be applied and, here, this method 
represents an important and hardly controversial ingredient to economic re-
search. 
(ii) Studies that try to evaluate the welfare effects of economic policy decisions 
by measuring stock market price changes (abnormal returns) caused by the 
announcement of these decisions (event studies to evaluate policy pro-
grams). It is this second way of applying event studies that we focus on in 
this paper.  
Even though both types rest on the same method, they are distinguishable regard-
ing their research targets: while the first type explains stock market reactions, the 
second type uses stock market reactions to evaluate policy decisions. The inherent 
logic of this second type of event studies crucially and sensitively rests on two (in-
terrelated) assumptions: 
1. Traders on the stock market exchange correctly anticipate the effects of the 
announced economic policy decisions on the profitability – including the fu-
ture profitability – of the companies whose stocks they are trading. The an-
ticipated profitability changes are immediately reflected into the current 
prices.  
                                                            
2  See for this the recent overview article by Corrado (2011) and the literature cited therein. 
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Eventually this first assumption rests on the so-called efficient financial market hy-
pothesis (EFMH). According to the EFMH, stock markets process the information 
codified in the event in a perfectly rational and efficient way. 
2. The increasing or decreasing profitability of the stock market companies al-
lows for conclusions regarding the welfare effects of the announced eco-
nomic policy decisions.  
The second assumption rests on the special economic theory of the effects of the 
announced policy decision. Thus, the exact expression of this second assumption 
differs among studies of different application fields. 
 
3. Evaluating Policy Programs or Decisions with the Help of Event Studies: 
Three Examples 
Three recent examples from the literature serve to illustrate how economic theory is 
employed to specify the link between profitability expectations of stock market 
traders and expected economic effects of policy programs or regulatory decisions. 
This link is crucial for the role of stock markets as referees on the ‘quality’ of politi-
cal decisions.  
The first example refers to the announcement of Regional Free Trade Agreements 
(RFTA; Moser & Rose 2011a, 2011b). If the announcement causes an increase in 
stock prices (i.e. increasing profits of the companies are expected), this is interpret-
ed as indication that the agreement leads to more trade and, therefore, according 
to standard trade theory to an increase in welfare. However, if the abnormal re-
turns are negative, the interpretation is that the country in question will not benefit 
from the RFTA, possibly because the negotiated trade conditions for this country 
are disadvantageous.3 Thus, abnormal stock market returns are employed as a ref-
eree in order to judge whether an announced RFTA is welfare-increasing (‘good 
policy decision’) or welfare-decreasing (‘bad policy decision’). Since stock markets 
do not only react to final RFTA announcements but also already to leaking infor-
                                                            
3 Maybe, the liberalization predominantly includes industries where this country suffers from a 
competitive disadvantage whereas industries where it enjoys a competitive advantage are 
excluded from the RFTA. 
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mation about the conditions of the RFTA and the probability of an agreement, the 
referee service of the stock markets reactions could actually already be used during 
the negotiation process to inform politicians about the effects of their possible de-
cisions. 
A second example refers to merger control decisions (Duso et al. 2011).4 It is as-
sumed that the welfare effects of horizontal mergers can be evaluated by looking 
at the stock price reactions of stocks of the merging companies and especially 
those of their rivals. Positive abnormal returns for the merging companies signal 
expectations of increasing profitability of the merger partners. However, this signal 
is ambiguous since increasing profitability, on the one hand, can be caused by mar-
ket power (anticompetitive effect detrimental to welfare) but, on the other hand, 
also by efficiency gains (procompetitive effect). Therefore, the focus is usually on 
the remaining rivals to the merging companies and follows a specific economic log-
ic: an anticompetitive merger, reducing competition in the relevant market, will 
increase the price level in the relevant market. As a consequence, the rivals to merg-
ing companies will benefit from the merger to the degree that the lower post-
merger competition intensity allows them to increase their prices, too, thus boost-
ing their profitability. A procompetitive merger, however, will increase post-merger 
competition in the relevant market due to the efficiency effects and thus harm the 
profitability of the outsiders to the merger. Consequently, positive abnormal re-
turns for rivals to the announced merger signal an anticompetitive merger whereas 
negative abnormal returns for rivals to the announced merger signal a 
procompetitive merger. This example shows that sometimes rather sophisticated 
economic theory is required to make the stock market signals unambiguously in-
terpretable. 
The third example addresses economic recovery programs supported International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Miyakoshi et al. 2007; Kutan et al. 2012). In case of econom-
ic or financial crises, the IMF offers support to programs that help the affected 
countries to improve their economic conditions and overcome the crisis situation. 
The welfare effects of such programs are evaluated by looking at the reactions of 
                                                            
4 The study by Duso et al. (2011) represents one of the best-developed examples. See Budzinski 
(2011, 2012a, b) for various other examples. 
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stock market prices of companies from different sectors to the announcement of 
IMF supported programs. The general assumption in this case is that positive ab-
normal returns for some specific sectors imply increasing profitability of the com-
panies within this sector and thus positive average welfare effects of the programs. 
In contrast, negative abnormal returns for the companies within other sectors sig-
nal decreasing profitability and thus negative welfare effects. Thus, the stock mar-
ket reactions are employed to evaluate the effects of IMF supported reform pro-
grams on different sectors of the economy. The underlying economic mechanism 
rests on the assumption that increasing profitability stems from a better sector-
specific economic climate, in particular increasing demand (i.e. the programs induc-
ing an economic upswing) or decreasing costs (i.e. the programs inducing structur-
al reforms decreasing factor and/or input costs). 
 
4. A Critical Reflection of Event Studies as Referees 
So, shall we hire the stock market as a referee on economic policy decisions? The 
answer corresponds to the reliability of the basic underlying assumption – the 
EFMH – as well as to the soundness and unambiguity of the employed economic 
theories interpreting the stock market signals.5 
 
4.1. Shall We Rely on the Rational Efficiencies of Financial Markets? 
The central question regarding the empirical reliability of the EFMH is whether 
stock markets are truly efficient and rational. Only if they worked perfectly, i.e. only 
if traders acted (hyper-) rational, all relevant information were available and this 
information was perfectly and efficiently processed, then event-triggered stock 
prices changes would reflect the true value of the traded stocks for the investors. 
However, within financial economics the reliability of the EFMH is viewed rather 
critical (inter alia, Shleifer & Summers 1990; Shleifer 2000; Shiller 2003). In particu-
lar, the increasingly popular branch of behavioral finance (and behavioral econom-
                                                            
5 See, inter alia, Hopkins & Connor (1992), Reynolds (2008) and Budzinski (2011, 2012a, b) and 
the literature cited therein. 
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ics in general) casts doubt on the EFMH and particularly on assumptions like availa-
bility of all relevant information and efficient and undistorted information pro-
cessing. Also referring to cognitive and psychological economics as well as based 
upon extensive empirical and experimental evidence, (subjectively) rational behavior 
is instead viewed to be something very different from ‘correct’ behavior (in the 
sense of ‘being always right in assessments and decisions’). Behavioral stock market 
phenomena like herd behavior, bubbles, over- and under-shooting effects, etc. as 
well as all sorts of biases in individual (selective) information perception, processing 
and interpretation are not very well compatible to a referee role on economic policy 
programs and decisions. 
Even if only the assumption of the availability of all relevant information is relaxed, 
it becomes doubtful whether stock market abnormal returns reliably signal future 
profitability effects. Already then, the effects anticipated by the investors (ex ante 
expected impact) start to deviate from the real effects (ex post actual impact) with 
the latter only coming into existence in the course of time (Cichello & Lamdin 2006; 
Reynolds 2008). The more the assumptions of complete information, perfect infor-
mation processing and perfect (hyper-) rationality have to be relaxed, the bigger 
becomes the discrepancy between investor expectations and effects. As a conse-
quence, the use of event studies as referees on the welfare effects of economic pol-
icy decisions must be viewed very skeptical if incomplete information, imperfect, 
selective and biased information processing as well as subjective rationality repre-
sent an adequate description of real-world stock markets. 
Furthermore, it can be questioned whether investors reacting to an announcement 
make their trading decisions with the same time horizon in mind that the welfare 
effects of the announced policy decision need to unfold. For instance, many eco-
nomic effects of RFTAs and IMF supported recovery programs will require some 
time before they manifest. Additionally, effects may follow a j-curve, i.e. (larger) 
positive welfare (profitability) effects may yield after an interim period of (smaller) 
negative effects. If investors do not plan to hold the stocks over a longer time they 
will rationally try to anticipate the stock prices at a point in time where the eventu-
al effects may not have occurred. For instance, there are some patterns that (in 
times of economic upswings) merger announcements temporarily increase the 
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stock prices of merging companies and rivals before they eventually decrease after 
the merger is consummated. An investor who is not planning to hold his shares 
until the merger process is completed may well speculate on these temporary in-
crease and buy as soon as first information become available (thus contributing to 
the rise in stock prices) – just in order to sell the stocks again before the merger is 
completed. Consequently, instead of anticipation of future profitability, the name 
of the game at the stock market may rather be: guessing what others probably 
guess and strategically including this in speculative and short-run stock trade. And 
this type of trade is likely to be very event (i.e. announcements, but also rumors)-
sensitive and represent event-specific effects (abnormal returns).  
Another obvious problem with using event studies as referees for welfare effects is 
the question whether stock market companies are sufficiently representative for the 
whole economy. Companies whose stocks are traded at the stock market with suf-
ficient frequency (to allow for a meaningful inclusion) represent only a subset of 
the whole economy. Furthermore, their structure in terms of size, affected indus-
tries, regional distribution, etc. is usually not representative.  
 
4.2. Are the Economic Theories Used to Interpret the Signals Sufficiently Un-
ambiguous? 
So, what about the second step of the referee role of event studies: can welfare 
effects of policies be fully concluded from changes in (expected) profitability of 
stock market companies following the announcement of such policies? This leads 
us back to the three different events cases introduced in section 3. 
Example One: Regional Free Trade Agreements 
Is it really sensible to conclude positive welfare effects from expected increasing 
profits (positive abnormal returns) triggered by the announcement of the RFTA? 
Next to liberalization gains and trade advantages, positive returns could also be 
due to the absence of hitherto expected (or suspected) liberalization effort in the 
agreement. If the RFTA protects the anticompetitive rents of big stock market com-
panies (or creates even more protectionism) in the shadow of an ostensible (politi-
10 
 
cally labeled) ‘liberalization’ agreement, then abnormal returns merely signal the 
maintenance (or new creation) of supra-competitive profits. The announcement-
specific reaction may be due to expectations that these anticompetitive rents would 
be eroded by the free trade agreement or by an unexpected inclusion of new pro-
tectionism. This effect would be especially strong if the gains from freer trade pre-
dominantly benefit smaller and\or non-stock market companies and, thus, are ne-
glected or under-proportionally reflected in the stock market reactions. A decrease 
in stock prices as a reaction to the announcement of a trade agreement can go 
hand in hand with welfare gains, if the losses are centralized with few big stock 
market companies (hitherto enjoying anticompetitive protection rents) whereas the 
gains are decentralized and dispersed among a large number of companies includ-
ing a large share of non-stock market companies as well as the emergence of new 
entrepreneurship. 
Example Two: Merger Control Decisions 
In this case, a central link is represented by the theory that anticompetitive mergers 
increase the profits of its rivals through the provision of a price umbrella (i.e. higher 
prices benefitting all companies in the market) whereas procompetitive mergers 
decrease the profits of their rivals due to the price-reducing effects of efficiencies. 
First of all, it is widely accepted that this holds only for horizontal mergers and not 
for vertical or conglomerate mergers. Since many mergers involve complex multi-
product companies, there is often a mixture of horizontal, vertical and conglomer-
ate effects that might be difficult to disentangle. Furthermore, among the many 
affected (product as well as geographical) markets of such a merger, the (often 
few) markets that drive anticompetitive concerns of competition authorities must 
be important enough for the overall multiproduct and multinational companies to 
dominate the abnormal returns. Secondly, even in the case of pure horizontal mer-
gers, the price umbrella effect is strongest in markets that resemble quantity com-
petition in rather homogenous Cournot oligopolies. In cases of price competition in 
differentiated product markets, the price umbrella differs in strength for different 
rivals and may become rather marginal for some. If horizontal mergers take place 
in markets that do not display sufficient similarities to the standard oligopoly mod-
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els, then the interpretation of rivals’ profit changes becomes ambiguous and un-
clear. Thirdly, economic theory also refers to cases in which anticompetitive hori-
zontal mergers harms rivals’ profits, inter alia, through (vertical) foreclosure effects 
regarding procurement and distribution or predatory and deterrence strategies as 
well as raising rivals’ costs strategies that enrich the arsenal of the (horizontally) 
merged companies as a consequence of their more powerful post-merger position. 
Fourthly, merger announcements often create ‘fantasy’ (in stock exchange par-
lance) about follow-up mergers among rivals to the merging companies. As a con-
sequence, abnormal returns may be driven by those speculations about rivals rather 
than by a rational assessment of the profitability effects on rivals. Eventually, we 
are not aware of any study that empirically analyses whether investors actually be-
lieve in the ‘anticompetitive mergers are good for rivals’ theory from industrial eco-
nomics. If the mental models of investors rather represent the belief that anticom-
petitive mergers are usually harming rivals’ profitability (even if this may be based 
on diffuse ordinary-man knowledge rather than game-theoretic economic theory), 
then the interpretation of the stock market signals is systematically flawed. In 
summary, it appears to be rather heroic to conclude from expectations about rivals’ 
profits on the competitive effects of a merger. Relying on ambiguous stock market 
signals when evaluating a merger control decisions involves a considerable risk of 
getting it wrong. 
Example Three: IMF Supported Recovery Programs 
Policy decisions on short-run macroeconomic strategies, for instance directed at the 
stabilization of exchange rates, or long run fundamental policy strategies targeting 
structural reforms are particularly prone to the general problems of differing time 
horizons between investors and effects, j-curve effects, lack of representativeness of 
stock market companies, etc. This is even more true since the actual ex-post im-
pacts will be based on how the society reacts to the announcement of the IMF pro-
gram and more importantly on how the government reacts to the advices from the 
IMF. Experience shows that there may be a considerable difference between the 
program and the implemented policies, for instance due to the government evad-
ing or diluting necessary (but unpopular) reforms are contradicting their effects 
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with other policy strategies. This further stretches the anticipation capabilities of 
the investors. Furthermore, negative abnormal returns of a sector (triggered by the 
IMF supported program) need not necessarily correspond to negative welfare ef-
fects. If the major companies of a sector (maybe very few if the sector is highly 
concentrated or even dominated by a government-related quasi-monopolist) lose 
privileges, protection from international competition or other anticompetitive rents 
in the course of the reforms of the IMF supported program, then investors will ra-
tionally expect their profits to decline. However, economic theory predicts that the 
corresponding increase in consumers’ rent will outweigh the loss of the anticom-
petitive rents by some margin and the welfare effect will be positive. Thus, negative 
abnormal returns may well correspond to welfare gains. In addition, the same res-
ervation as in the case of the RFTAs about centralized and stock market relevant 
losses being overcompensated by decentralized and stock market irrelevant gains 
applies here. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
It is tempting to hire the stock market as a ‘neutral’ referee for assessing economic 
policy decisions. One reason is certainly the desire for having an external, unbiased 
and neutral evaluator who is not subject to party interests or career concerns. An-
other reason is related to the feasibility bias (Budzinski 2012b): the data availability 
for event studies is often much easier and better than for other evaluation meth-
ods, thus facilitating the production of this type of academic studies. Yet, it is nec-
essary to issue a note of caution. Firstly, it is doubtful whether stock market reac-
tions (abnormal returns) really reveal superior knowledge about economic effects.6 
Secondly, the obtained signals usually offer more than one economic interpretation 
and thus are considerably ambiguous. Consequently, it is rather doubtful that event 
studies can be successfully employed to evaluate the ‘quality’ of economic policy 
decisions, programs or reforms with a sufficient reliability. Even if conducted to the 
highest econometric standards, it would represent a risky gambling to adjust policy 
decisions according to the reactions of the stock market. Consequently, any ten-
                                                            
6 See Neven & Zenger (2008) for a reasoning that experts may enjoy superior knowledge to stock 
markets. 
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dency to increasingly using event studies as an instrument to evaluate economic 
policy decisions must be viewed with serious concerns. Event studies represent a 
highly valuable method in the context of their original employment, i.e. research 
aiming to identify what drives stock market prices. However, they are not suited to 
replace or complement thorough economic analysis of the effects of policy deci-
sions, programs and regulatory reforms. 
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